U.S. All Star Federation v. Open Cheer — Eleventh Circuit Revives ‘The Cheerleading Worlds’ Trademark Suit

Background

The U.S. All Star Federation (USASF) is the governing body for competitive “All Star” cheerleading — the form of cheerleading where athletes represent private gyms and clubs rather than school sports teams. Since 2004, USASF has hosted a prestigious annual championship at Disney World in Orlando known as “Championship Week,” featuring two component events: The Cheerleading Worlds and The Dance Worlds. Over twenty years, “The Cheerleading Worlds” — or simply “Worlds” — became the capstone event of the competitive All Star season, attracting the highest-level teams from around the globe.

In 2020, a group of former USASF members — David Owens, Heidi Weber, Jeb Harris, and David Hanbery — formed Open Cheer & Dance Championship Series and launched a competing season-end event called “Allstar Worlds Championship” or “Allstar Worlds.” The competing event runs at roughly the same time and in the same city (the Orange County Convention Center in Orlando). USASF alleged that the similar name caused widespread confusion: athletes, parents, coaches, and media regularly confused the two events, and some received what they believed were invitations to “Worlds” only to learn they had been invited to Open Cheer’s rival event.

USASF sued in December 2021, asserting federal and state trademark infringement and related claims based on two marks: (1) THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS (registered on the Supplemental Register) and (2) WORLDS (common law only). The Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment for Open Cheer, ruling that both marks were generic as a matter of law and therefore incapable of trademark protection. USASF appealed.

The Court’s Holding

The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Writing for the court, Judge Marcus concluded that the district court made two key errors.

First, on a procedural point, the district court had improperly treated the genericness inquiry as foreclosed because Open Cheer’s “affirmative defense” of genericness had earlier been dismissed with prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit held this was error: challenging whether a mark is distinctive is not an affirmative defense at all — it simply attacks an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Open Cheer’s general denial of distinctiveness remained alive throughout the litigation, so the district court was obligated to consider the full record on that element.

Second, and more substantively, the court held that the district court was wrong to declare the marks generic as a matter of law. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court on one point: the marks are not suggestive because “THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS” and “WORLDS” describe an international cheerleading competition directly, without requiring an imaginative leap. But the court found the district court jumped too quickly from “not suggestive” to “generic.” The spectrum of trademark distinctiveness runs from generic (unprotectable) through descriptive (protectable only if the mark has acquired secondary meaning) to suggestive and arbitrary (inherently distinctive). Skipping the “descriptive” category entirely was reversible error.

On the record before it, the Eleventh Circuit found substantial evidence that a reasonable jury could find the marks are descriptive and have acquired secondary meaning through long and substantially exclusive use: USASF has used both marks since 2004 across 20+ years of events; coaches, athletes, parents, media outlets, and even some of the defendants themselves routinely referred to USASF’s event simply as “Worlds”; and there was direct testimony of actual confusion. The district court erred in discounting that evidence and resolving those credibility and weight-of-evidence questions at summary judgment rather than leaving them for the jury. The case is remanded for trial on whether the marks have acquired secondary meaning.

Key Takeaways

• Genericness is not default. Courts cannot skip the “descriptive with secondary meaning” category and jump straight from “not suggestive” to “generic.” The Eleventh Circuit reaffirms that this is a distinct category requiring its own analysis.
• Long exclusive use can create secondary meaning even for facially descriptive terms. Twenty years of consistent, substantially exclusive use of a term — combined with widespread public association of the mark with a specific event — can be sufficient to create a genuine fact issue for the jury on secondary meaning.
• Watch your affirmative defenses. Labeling something an “affirmative defense” when it actually goes to the plaintiff’s prima facie case is a pleading error, but it does not waive a properly made general denial of the same element.
• Competitor evidence cuts both ways. Open Cheer’s own use of the name “Allstar Worlds” — and the evidence that consumers confused the two events — ultimately supported the inference that “Worlds” was identified with USASF’s specific event, not just the category of “world championship cheerleading competitions.”

Why It Matters

This decision is a reminder that event organizers, sports governing bodies, and associations can build protectable trademark rights in competition names over decades of consistent use, even if those names seem descriptive at first glance. For organizations in the events and sports industry, the key lesson is that long exclusive use backed by evidence of public association can eventually convert a descriptive term into an enforceable mark.

For defendants accused of infringement, the case cautions against relying solely on a “genericness” attack at summary judgment: if there is substantial evidence of the public associating the mark with a single source, the case will almost certainly go to trial. The cheerleading dispute — now entering its fifth year of litigation — will head back to the Middle District of Florida for a jury to resolve whether the marks have the secondary meaning that would make “The Cheerleading Worlds” something Open Cheer is not free to trade on.