Nathan & Sons, LLC v. Larine, LLC — Copyright case transferred to the Southern District of Texas because doubtful personal jurisdiction made Colorado inconvenient and transfer favored a merits decision

Background

Nathan and Sons, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, filed this action on April 23, 2024, against Larine, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company identified in the caption as the successor by merger to Strategic Nexus, LLC, a New Jersey limited liability company. The complaint asserted claims for copyright infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and deceptive trade practices. The order did not construe any of those claims, identify any accused works, or describe the allegedly infringing conduct; it decided only where the litigation should proceed.

On September 15, 2026, Larine moved to transfer or dismiss, arguing that the Colorado court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, and Nathan and Sons initially opposed that motion. On October 26, 2026, however, the parties filed a joint stipulation stating that the plaintiff no longer opposed transfer to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, and both sides asked the court to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Larine also represented that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of Texas because it is located in Texas.

The Court’s Holding

Judge Philip A. Brimmer granted the transfer portion of Larine's motion and ordered the action transferred. The court first clarified that § 1404(a) does not permit the parties to stipulate to transfer; the statute instead vests discretion in the district court to transfer a civil action to another district or division to which all parties have consented, based on an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness. To warrant transfer, the moving party must establish that the action could have been brought in the alternate forum, that the existing forum is inconvenient, and that the interests of justice are better served in the alternate forum.

The court found all three requirements satisfied. It was satisfied that the action could have been brought in the Southern District of Texas, relying on the parties' consent and the settled principle that a party can consent to personal jurisdiction of a court. It treated the existing forum as inconvenient because personal jurisdiction over Larine in Colorado was likely absent. And it concluded that the interests of justice were better served in the alternate forum because, in the absence of jurisdictional concerns, there was a higher chance that the plaintiff's claims would be heard on the merits.

Accordingly, the court ordered that the motion at Docket No. 30 was granted in part and that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the action shall be transferred to the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The disposition did not dismiss any claim, and the court made no ruling on copyright infringement, liability, false advertising, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, or remedies.

Key Takeaways

• Section 1404(a) transfer remains a judicial decision: parties may consent to a transferee forum, but the court must independently weigh convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice.
• A defendant seeking transfer must show that the action could have been brought in the alternate forum, that the existing forum is inconvenient, and that the interests of justice favor the new forum.
• Doubt about personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the existing forum can render that forum inconvenient in the court's case-specific analysis.
• Removing jurisdictional obstacles can serve the interests of justice by increasing the likelihood that the plaintiff's claims will be decided on the merits rather than lost to a jurisdictional defect.
• The order transferred the entire action, including the copyright infringement claim, to Texas without adjudicating any of the plaintiff's claims.

Why It Matters

The decision illustrates how personal-jurisdiction concerns can drive a § 1404(a) transfer analysis in a copyright case even after the plaintiff initially opposed transfer. Rather than dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction, the court used transfer to move the dispute to a forum where jurisdiction was undisputed, preserving the plaintiff's opportunity for a merits determination.

The order also draws a line between party agreement and judicial discretion. Although both parties jointly requested transfer, the court applied the statutory convenience-and-justice framework itself and expressly noted that § 1404(a) does not state that parties may stipulate to transfer a case.