Background
Rimini Street, Inc. is a third-party provider of software support services for Oracle enterprise software. Oracle sued Rimini for copyright infringement, alleging that Rimini had improperly copied Oracle’s software and documentation when providing support services to Oracle’s customers. A jury found Rimini liable and awarded Oracle damages. The district court also awarded Oracle’s costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505, which authorizes a court to “allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party.”
The district court’s costs award totaled approximately $28.5 million, including nearly $12.8 million in expenses that went beyond the six categories enumerated in the general federal costs statute (28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920) — including costs for expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consultants. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that § 505’s use of the word “full” expanded the categories of recoverable costs beyond the general statutory schedule. Rimini petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that “full” simply meant all costs within the standard categories, not costs outside those categories.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously. Writing for the Court, Justice Kavanaugh held that the term “full costs” in § 505 of the Copyright Act means the “full” amount of costs within the categories defined by the general federal costs statutes — not a broader universe of litigation expenses. The word “full” is an adjective modifying “costs,” and “costs” is a term of art in federal law that refers specifically to the categories of expenses enumerated in §§ 1821 and 1920: clerk’s fees, marshal fees, transcript fees, printing and copying costs, witness fees, and certain expert fees.
The Court rejected the argument that the modifier “full” expanded the substantive categories of recoverable costs. Congress, the Court noted, knows how to expand the categories of recoverable costs when it wants to — it does so by using explicit language, not by adding the word “full.” Without such explicit expansion, the six traditional cost categories control, and prevailing copyright plaintiffs cannot recover expenses like e-discovery fees, jury consultant fees, or other non-enumerated litigation costs through § 505 alone.
Key Takeaways
- The Copyright Act’s authorization to award “full costs” under § 505 is limited to the six categories of costs specified in the general federal costs statutes — not all litigation expenses.
- Costs outside those statutory categories — including e-discovery costs, jury consultant fees, and many expert witness expenses — cannot be recovered as “full costs” under the Copyright Act.
- Congress must use explicit language to expand cost-recovery beyond the general statutory framework; adding the word “full” does not do so.
- The ruling significantly limits the cost exposure for defendants in copyright infringement cases, particularly in cases involving complex e-discovery or extensive expert witness testimony.
Why It Matters
Rimini Street v. Oracle resolved a longstanding circuit split over the scope of § 505’s costs provision. Before this decision, some courts had interpreted “full costs” expansively to encompass virtually all litigation expenses a copyright plaintiff had incurred, potentially exposing defendants to cost awards of tens of millions of dollars beyond the actual damages award. The Supreme Court’s ruling brings uniformity: cost awards in copyright cases are capped at the standard statutory categories available in all federal civil litigation.
For parties in large commercial copyright disputes — particularly software companies, technology firms, and media companies that frequently litigate expensive copyright cases involving complex e-discovery and expert-intensive damages analyses — this decision provides an important check on non-damages cost exposure. Defendants who prevail on appeal or in litigation can take comfort that they will not face outsized cost awards reaching deep into non-statutory expense categories. The decision also highlights the Supreme Court’s consistent approach of reading cost-shifting provisions narrowly in the absence of explicit congressional direction.