Yuga Labs v. Ripps — Ninth Circuit Holds NFTs Are ‘Goods’ Under the Lanham Act and Reverses Trademark Summary Judgment

Background

Yuga Labs is the creator of the Bored Ape Yacht Club, a high-profile NFT collection that sold for hundreds of millions of dollars at peak. Conceptual artist Ryder Ripps, joined by Jeremy Cahen, created and sold a parallel NFT collection called RR/BAYC using the same Bored Ape images, marketed as a critique of the original. Yuga sued for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and cybersquatting under the ACPA. Ripps filed DMCA § 512(f) counterclaims based on takedown notices Yuga sent to OpenSea and other marketplaces.

The district court granted Yuga summary judgment on most claims, holding that NFTs are “goods” under the Lanham Act, that consumer confusion was established as a matter of law, and that Ripps had cybersquatted by registering rrbayc.com. Ripps’s § 512(f) counterclaim was dismissed on the ground that trademark-based takedown notices fall outside § 512’s scope. Both sides appealed.

The Court’s Holding

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. On the threshold question, the court held that NFTs qualify as “goods” for purposes of trademark law, distinct from the underlying digital images they reference. An NFT is, in the court’s framing, a distinct asset whose value comes from blockchain provenance, scarcity, and trading utility, not merely the image it points to. That holding is consequential beyond this case: it confirms that the Lanham Act applies to NFT collections as such.

But the court reversed the summary-judgment ruling on likelihood of confusion. Looking at the eight-factor Sleekcraft test, the court found genuine disputes of material fact: NFT buyers tend to be sophisticated; the secondary-market price differentials between BAYC and RR/BAYC were enormous; and Ripps explicitly marketed his collection as a satirical critique. A reasonable jury could go either way on confusion, and that means the issue belongs to the jury. The court likewise reversed summary judgment on cybersquatting: while bad faith was disputed, “confusing similarity” under the ACPA is itself a factual question the district court had decided too readily.

The court affirmed the dismissal of Ripps’s § 512(f) counterclaims. Yuga’s takedown notices were grounded in trademark, not copyright. Section 512(f) creates a remedy only for material misrepresentations made “under this section” — meaning the DMCA’s copyright safe-harbor scheme. Notices that are nominally labeled DMCA but actually assert trademark claims are not § 512(f) violations.

Key Takeaways

• NFTs are “goods” for Lanham Act purposes in the Ninth Circuit. That ends one of the foundational definitional debates in the NFT-trademark caselaw.
• Likelihood of confusion in NFT trademark cases is rarely a summary-judgment issue. Sophistication of NFT buyers, the explicit-critique framing of many parallel collections, and price differences make these factual disputes for the jury.
• ACPA cybersquatting analysis must include genuine fact-finding on confusing similarity. Domain names that include the trademark are not automatically infringing as a matter of law.
• DMCA § 512(f) does not police trademark-based takedown notices. Trademark holders who use the DMCA pipeline to assert trademark claims may face liability under other theories — tortious interference, abuse of process — but not under § 512(f).

Why It Matters

This is the first appellate decision squarely holding that NFTs are goods under the Lanham Act. It anchors a body of caselaw — Hermes v. Rothschild, Nike v. StockX — that had been working through the issue at the district-court level. The downstream consequences for NFT projects are real: any NFT collection trading off another collection’s brand can be sued for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and cybersquatting, with the same doctrinal framework that applies to physical goods.

At the same time, the reversal on likelihood of confusion gives some breathing room to satirical, critical, and parody NFT projects. Pure copying is still risky. But where there is genuine artistic critique, sophisticated buyers, and a clearly differentiated price point, the case will go to a jury rather than being disposed of on the pleadings or by summary judgment. The court’s § 512(f) ruling closes a defensive avenue for NFT artists who feel weaponized takedowns — they will need to litigate those grievances under tort theories instead.