Weekend Warrior Clothing v. Google — Shopping Ads Platform Not Directly or Contributorily Liable for Merchants’ Copycat T-Shirts

Case
Weekend Warrior Clothing, LLC v. Google, LLC
Court
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Western Division)
Judge
Douglas R. Cole (appointment info not available)
Date Decided
October 14, 2026
Docket No.
1:25-cv-00668
Topics
copyright, direct infringement, volitional conduct, contributory infringement, Cox v. Sony, online advertising

Background

Weekend Warrior Clothing, LLC sells holiday, patriotic and humor-themed t-shirts online and says it had registered copyrights in 58 of its designs when it sued. It alleged that copycat sellers use Google’s Shopping Ads program to advertise exact copies of its designs at lower prices, and that those sponsored listings sometimes appear above Weekend Warrior’s own site. In Shopping Ads, merchants pay Google and submit product data and an image link; Google’s system automatically matches searches to merchants’ ads, and the user’s browser retrieves the image from the merchant’s own website. Merchants, not Google, handle the sale. Weekend Warrior said it sent takedown notices under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and that Google sometimes said it would remove listings but did not, and other times did not respond.

Weekend Warrior sued only Google, not the merchants, for direct and contributory copyright infringement based on the display of the images. Google moved to dismiss. While the motion was pending, the parties submitted supplemental authority on two Supreme Court decisions: Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment (2026), which addressed contributory copyright liability, and Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. (2026), which addressed contributory patent infringement.

The Court’s Holding

The court granted Google’s motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

Direct infringement. The court focused on the “volitional conduct” requirement, which asks whether the defendant itself caused the infringing act. The Sixth Circuit has neither adopted nor rejected it, but the court noted that every circuit to address it has adopted some version, and it explained that the requirement helps separate direct from secondary liability. Online platforms generally do not engage in volitional conduct when third parties supply the infringing content and the platform only operates an automated process. Selecting the infringing content, by contrast, crosses the line. Here, the merchants supplied the product data and image links, and Google’s system automatically matched ads to searches. The court said that deciding where sponsored results appear and how they are matched is not selection of the particular infringing images, and nothing in the complaint suggested human involvement in individual selections. Nor did Google’s alleged failure to respond to takedown notices amount to volitional conduct causing the original infringement; responding to notices is a form of monitoring third parties, which is a secondary-liability theory. Knowledge of infringement is irrelevant to the direct-liability question because the volitional-conduct rule concerns causation. Because the court resolved the claim on this ground, it did not decide whether the “server test” applies.

Contributory infringement. Applying Cox, the court explained that contributory liability requires that the provider intended its service to be used for infringement, shown either by inducing infringement or by selling a service tailored to infringement (one not capable of substantial noninfringing uses). Cox also made clear that liability cannot rest merely on knowledge that customers may infringe or on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement. Weekend Warrior’s theory was essentially that Google knew about the infringement and did not do enough to stop it, which is the theory Cox rejected. The court found no allegation that Google promoted Shopping Ads as a means of infringement, and said Weekend Warrior could not deny that the program has substantial lawful uses. Generally promoting products in sponsored results is different from promoting the platform’s use for infringement, and there was no allegation that Google privileged infringing products. The court distinguished three post-Cox district court decisions Weekend Warrior cited, which involved services built to connect users to unauthorized streams, algorithms designed to download and distribute films through BitTorrent, and tools allegedly designed to help customers use datasets of pirated books.

Because Weekend Warrior might cure the deficiencies, the court will keep the case open for 30 days so it can move for leave to amend and attach a proposed amended complaint. If it does not, the court will enter judgment dismissing the case without prejudice.

Key Takeaways

  • A platform that runs an automated advertising process using merchant-supplied images and data generally is not a direct infringer under the volitional-conduct requirement unless it selects the infringing content itself.
  • After Cox, contributory copyright liability requires intent shown through inducement or a service tailored to infringement; knowledge plus inaction is not enough.
  • Ignoring takedown notices does not by itself turn a platform into a direct infringer or a contributory infringer under this ruling.
  • Plaintiffs who want to reach intermediaries need specific factual allegations of promotion, marketing or design aimed at infringement, such as those in the post-Cox cases the court distinguished.

Why It Matters

The decision is an early application of Cox to an online advertising platform and shows how the Supreme Court’s emphasis on intent narrows secondary liability for general-purpose services. Brand owners fighting counterfeit or copycat sellers may find it harder to hold ad platforms and marketplaces responsible on a knowledge-and-failure-to-act theory, and may need to pursue the merchants themselves or plead facts showing intentional encouragement.

For platforms, the ruling supports the view that automated matching of merchant-supplied content does not itself amount to selecting infringing material. It is a district court ruling at the pleading stage, dismissed without prejudice, and the plaintiff has been given an opportunity to seek leave to amend.

Full Opinion

Your browser cannot display this PDF inline.

Download the full opinion (PDF)

Leave a Comment

Scroll to Top