United States v. Ding — Court Vacates AI Economic-Espionage Convictions for Lack of Foreign-Benefit Intent

Background

Linwei Ding worked as a software engineer in Google’s artificial-intelligence program. Between May 2022 and April 2023, he copied numerous AI-related trade-secret documents into a personal cloud account through a process designed to evade Google’s security controls. A jury convicted him of theft of trade secrets and economic espionage.

The two offenses require different proof. Trade-secret theft can be established by an intent to benefit someone other than the owner. Economic espionage under 18 U.S.C. § 1831 additionally requires knowledge or intent that the conduct will benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent. Ding sought judgment of acquittal on the economic-espionage counts.

The Court’s Holding

The court granted acquittal on the economic-espionage counts while leaving the trade-secret-theft verdict intact. The evidence readily supported a finding that Ding stole Google’s materials to benefit himself and a planned private AI company in China. But the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time of the charged uploads, Ding knew or intended that the theft would benefit the Chinese government.

The court emphasized timing. Ding’s uploads began well before the earliest evidence that he contemplated relationships with Chinese government entities. Later contacts and a later download of the files might have supported a different theory, but the prosecution had not presented that theory to the jury. It could not preserve the verdict after trial by switching from the charged upload-period theory to later conduct. Because the evidence was insufficient on the theory tried, double-jeopardy principles required acquittal rather than a new trial.

Key Takeaways

• Proof that stolen trade secrets may ultimately aid a foreign country is not enough; § 1831 requires the specified foreign-benefit intent or knowledge.
• The defendant’s state of mind must coincide with conduct supporting the charged economic-espionage offense.
• Prosecutors cannot rescue an insufficient verdict with a materially different post-trial theory that was not presented to the jury.

Why It Matters

The order draws a sharp line between ordinary criminal trade-secret theft and economic espionage in a strategically sensitive AI case. Employees who copy proprietary AI materials for a private overseas venture may commit serious trade-secret crimes, yet the government still must separately establish the foreign-government nexus. The decision also highlights the importance of charging decisions and timelines when private technology ventures later develop government relationships.