Cortés-Ramos v. Martin-Morales — 1st Circuit Revives Song Theft Case Against Ricky Martin, Faults District Court for Denying All Discovery

Background

Luis Adrián Cortés-Ramos has been fighting Ricky Martin in federal court for twelve years across five appeals and three separate lawsuits — all stemming from the same core events. In 2013, Sony and Ricky Martin co-sponsored the “SuperSong” contest, inviting entrants to compose an original song for the 2014 FIFA World Cup Official Album. Cortés entered, became a top-twenty finalist, and signed documents provided by Sony before the contest deadline. A different entrant was announced the winner on February 10, 2014. Then, in April 2014, Martin released “Vida” — a song Cortés claims is substantially similar to his own submission. Cortés has spent the years since trying to get a court to hear that claim on the merits.

The central procedural obstacle has been consistent: the case has always gotten stuck before discovery could begin. In prior rounds, the litigation was derailed by motions to dismiss. In this, the third lawsuit, Cortés survived a motion for judgment on the pleadings and finally seemed positioned for discovery — until the district court pivoted directly to summary judgment, specifically stating it would consider the matter under the summary judgment standard “[t]o avoid discovery and unnecessary litigation.” With no discovery conducted, no initial disclosures exchanged, and no scheduling conference ever held, the district court granted Martin’s summary judgment motion and also invalidated Cortés’s copyright registration certificate.

The Court’s Holding

The 1st Circuit, per Circuit Judge Thompson, vacated the summary judgment and remanded for discovery. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) by rushing to summary judgment while denying Cortés any meaningful opportunity for discovery.

The core Rule 56(d) analysis centers on whether a party opposing summary judgment can show good cause to defer ruling until it can obtain facts essential to its opposition. The 1st Circuit walked through five factors — authoritativeness, timeliness, good cause, utility, and materiality — and found them satisfied, even though Cortés had not filed a formal Rule 56(d) affidavit. The court relaxed that formality given the unique circumstances: eight years of litigation had produced no discovery across any of Cortés’s cases because every prior round was consumed by motions to dismiss. Cortés timely and repeatedly told the district court he needed discovery. And critically, Martin and Sony — not Cortés — controlled all the relevant documents about the SuperSong Contest.

The panel emphasized that when a party “has no opportunity for discovery, denying the Rule 56([d]) motion and ruling on a summary judgment motion is likely to be an abuse of discretion.” The district court’s justification — that Cortés had failed to make initial disclosures — was unpersuasive when the court had simultaneously refused to open discovery at all. Cortés had filed motions for an initial scheduling conference as early as March 2023; the district court denied them without explanation, then denied reconsideration the same day. Denying Cortés a chance to “trust, but verify” (quoting the Supreme Court’s observation in Procter & Gamble about the purpose of discovery) what documents Martin actually possessed was reversible error.

Because the summary judgment was vacated on discovery grounds, the 1st Circuit expressly declined to reach the merits — including whether Cortés’s copyright registration was valid and whether Martin’s “Vida” infringed his submission. Both issues go back to the district court for further proceedings. Chief Judge Barron dissented in part, arguing that Cortés had not properly invoked Rule 56(d) arguments before the district court and had not engaged with the district court’s Rule 26 reasoning on appeal.

Key Takeaways

• A district court that deliberately shortcuts the discovery phase “[t]o avoid discovery” while proceeding directly to summary judgment exposes itself to reversal when the non-movant has diligently and repeatedly sought discovery.
• Rule 56(d) formalities (requiring a separate affidavit or declaration) can be relaxed in extraordinary circumstances — especially when a party has had no discovery whatsoever after years of litigation, the relevant evidence is entirely in the opposing party’s control, and the opposing party prevented even initial disclosures from occurring.
• The copyright merits remain entirely unresolved: Has Cortés validly registered his copyright? Is Martin’s “Vida” substantially similar to Cortés’s submission? Those questions go back to the district court.
• The costs award goes to Cortés for the appeal — a small but meaningful signal that the 1st Circuit viewed the district court’s handling of the discovery issue as genuinely problematic.

Why It Matters

For copyright practitioners, this decision is a pointed reminder that a district court’s power to manage its docket — including accelerating to summary judgment “to avoid unnecessary litigation” — has firm limits when one party has had no opportunity for any discovery. Where the defendant holds all the relevant evidence, requiring the plaintiff to oppose summary judgment with no discovery is effectively requiring them to lose. The 1st Circuit’s flexible application of Rule 56(d) formalities preserves the principle that summary judgment is a post-discovery mechanism, not a discovery-avoidance tool.

For the non-lawyer audience following this case: after twelve years and five appeals, the actual copyright question — did Ricky Martin’s team copy Luis Cortés-Ramos’s song? — has still never been tested in court. The June 12 ruling sends the case back for a first round of real discovery. Only then will a court finally reach the merits of whether “Vida” is a copy.